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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Following the conclusion of a federal jury trial, a unique tension 
exists between the notion of a “fair verdict” and the American legal 
system’s historical veneration of private jury deliberations. When a 
litigant alleges that a fair trial was denied after jury deliberations have 
concluded, the resolution of this allegation directly conflicts with the 
systemic interest in verdict finality. Few would deny that a losing 
litigant deserves a new trial if the jury’s verdict was tainted by 
something external to the protections of the courtroom.1 Conversely, it 
is well-recognized that, unlike fine wine, steaks, and cheese, lawsuits 
do not improve with age because as time passes, memories fade, 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2009, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. Special thank you to both my wife, Lizzie—I am nothing without 
you—and to my son, Owen—you inspire me every day.  I love you both more than 
you will ever know!  
1 James W. Diehm, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts: Tanner v. United States and 
Beyond, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 389, 403 (1991) (noting that external influences 
would include: threats against jurors, outside or erroneous information provided to 
jurors, or other improper influences). See, e.g., Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 
523 F.2d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 1975) (jurors learned extra-record facts about the case not 
introduced during trial). 
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witnesses become unavailable, and evidence is often lost.2 The final 
result may not be a fair verdict, because it may have more to do with 
the good fortune of a party in obtaining evidence for the second trial 
rather than the actual merits of the case.3 Accordingly, society has a 
substantial interest in assuring that judicial verdicts, at some point, are 
viewed as final.4  
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)5 attempts to mediate between 
these interests by recognizing the importance of verdict finality, but it 
also recognizes that due process6 may trump verdict finality. Rule 
606(b) maintains the viability of the jury system because it 
discourages the harassment of jurors by losing litigants, encourages 
free and open discussion among jurors during deliberations, reduces 
the incentive for jury tampering, and promotes verdict finality.7 The 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently addressed Rule 
                                                 
2 Id. at 402 (1991). 
3 Id. See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 520-21 (1972) (discussing the 
costs to society and litigants when trials become lengthy). 
4 See infra Part II. B. 
5 Federal Rule 606(b) states: 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a 
juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring 
during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of 
anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as 
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or 
indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in 
connection therewith. But a juror may testify about (1) whether 
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to 
the jury's attention, (2) whether any outside influence was 
improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether there 
was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form. A 
juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror may 
not be received on a matter about which the juror would be 
precluded from testifying.  
FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be...deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process”). 
7 United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 915 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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606(b) in Arreola v. Choudry,8 where the plaintiff alleged that he was 
denied a fair trial, claiming that a juror’s past experience with ankle 
injuries was “extraneous prejudicial information.” The court, however, 
held that a juror’s internal knowledge of ankle injuries was not 
extraneous prejudicial information, thus Rule 606(b) would not permit 
juror testimony to impeach9 the verdict.10 Although the holding in this 
case was correct, two issues concerning Rule 606(b) stem from this 
decision. First, would the result have changed had this been a criminal 
trial; in other words, does the Sixth Amendment11 provide a sharper 
blade to pierce the shield of Rule 606(b)? Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, what qualifies as extraneous prejudicial information, how 
do courts determine extraneous prejudicial information, and how 
should courts proceed when extraneous prejudicial information was 
present during deliberations?  
The confusion underlying the divergent approaches to the 
application of extraneous prejudicial information stems from the 
ambiguous language of Rule 606(b), the Supreme Court’s limited and 
unclear pronouncements regarding this language, and the Court’s 
failure to specifically address what constitutes “extraneous prejudicial 
information.” While the protections of Rule 606(b) are vital to the jury 
system, an absolute prohibition of juror testimony could thwart one of 
the fundamental purposes of a criminal jury trial.12 Therefore, courts 
throughout the Seventh Circuit need guidance as to what qualifies as 
                                                 
8 533 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 8576 (2008). 
9 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (impeach, vb. 1. To charge 
with a crime or misconduct; 2. To discredit the veracity of; 3. To challenge the 
accuracy or authenticity of). 
10 Arreola, 533 F.3d at 607. 
11 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury…to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him…and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense.”). 
12 See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965) (“The requirement that a 
jury's verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial goes to the 
fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by 
jury.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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extraneous prejudicial information and how to proceed when 
extraneous prejudicial information is alleged to have tainted the jury’s 
verdict.  
Accordingly, this article attempts to provide the needed guidance 
on this important issue of jury impeachment, with a focus on criminal 
trials. While Rule 606(b) contains three distinct exceptions,13 this 
article focuses on extraneous prejudicial information and its 
application during criminal jury trials. This article begins with a brief 
background of the common law prior to the enactment of Rule 606(b), 
the legislative history of Rule 606(b), and the subsequent 
interpretations thereof.14 Next, it reviews the Seventh’s Circuit’s 
recent application of Rule 606(b) in Arreola v. Choudry. Finally, it 
provides guidance to the courts in addressing “extraneous pre
information” and how courts should proceed when extraneous 
prejudicial information has been alleged by a losing litigant.   
judicial 
                                                
 
II. IMPEACHMENT OF JURY VERDICTS AND FEDERAL RULE OF 
EVIDENCE 606(B) 
 
A. The Tension Between a Criminal Defendant’s Rights 
During Trial and the Policies of Rule 606(b)  
 
A criminal defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury trial has 
been deemed one of the most fundamental American rights.15 Jurors 
are chosen from the community at large and their verdicts are viewed 
as credible because they reflect the values of their community and 
 
13  See FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
14 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, 
Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 
211-29 (1989) (providing detailed explanation of the history of Rule 606(b)); Peter 
N. Thompson, Challenge to the Decision Making Process—Federal Rule of 
Evidence 606(b) and the Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial, 38 SW. L.J. 1187, 
1196-206 (1985) (same). 
15 Robinson v. Polk, 444 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2006) (King, J., dissenting) 
(“the right to an impartial jury stands among those most revered by the founding 
generation.”).  
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protect the accused against oppression by the government.16  During a 
criminal trial, jurors are expected to weigh the evidence and arguments 
of counsel, assess the credibility of witnesses, listen to the instructions 
given by the court, and deliberate in hopes of rendering a just 
verdict.17 Life experiences of jurors inevitably enter the jury room,18 
but the Sixth Amendment requires that jurors base their decisions 
solely on the facts and law presented during the trial, thus preserving 
the rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and counsel.19 If 
extraneous information swayed the jury’s verdict,20 few would argue 
that the losing party should be denied a new trial if it can be 
unequivocally demonstrated that the verdict was tainted.21 
Although the jury system is not perfect, a complete sanitizing of 
the jury room is impossible.22 Jurors provide a vital public service in 
exchange for little or no compensation. Indeed, Congress has 
recognized the jury’s importance to our system of justice and has 
                                                 
16 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (“the essential feature of a 
jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the 
commonsense judgment of…the community…that results from [the community’s] 
determination of guilt or innocence.”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155–56 
(1968) (noting that the purpose of the jury trial is to prevent oppression by the 
Government).  
17 See Diehm, supra note 1, at 394–95.  
18 See J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“Jurors are not expected to come into the jury box and leave behind all 
that their human experience has taught them. Individuals are not expected to ignore 
as jurors what they know as [people]” internal citations omitted); Shillcutt v. 
Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that human compassion is one 
of the strengths of our jury system).   
19 See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, (1961) (holding that the Impartial 
Jury Clause "guarantees . . . a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors."); 
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965) (holding that the right of 
confrontation requires that “the evidence…against a defendant shall come from the 
witness stand …where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's rights.").  
20 See Diehm, supra note 1, at 403-404. 
21 See id. at 404. But see Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896) 
(holding that a verdict of acquittal was final and could not be reviewed, on error or 
otherwise, without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment).  
22 United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir. 1970).   
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implemented other protection for jurors.23 In order to safeguard the 
jury system, society must protect the jury and the deliberation process 
from outside scrutiny.24 Accordingly, Rule 606(b) is designed not only 
to protect jurors from being pestered by lawyers after the verdict is 
rendered but also to protect the judicial process from efforts to 
undermine a verdict.25 By prohibiting jurors from testifying as to 
matters which occurred during deliberations, Rule 606(b) discourages 
almost all inquires into the jurors' deliberative process once a verdict is 
rendered.26  
 
B. The Juror Impeachment Rule and Its Underlying Polices  
 
Protection of jury deliberations originated with the common law 
juror impeachment rule, which came from Lord Mansfield’s decision 
in Vaise v. Delaval.27 Under this rule, jurors were prohibited from 
testifying as to any matter related to their deliberations.28 The policy 
behind the rigid Mansfield Rule was straightforward: if a juror was 
engaged in wrongful conduct during deliberations, then his subsequent 
testimony was considered untrustworthy.29 Although this bright line 
rule is considered harsh under today’s standards, courts continued to 
apply this rule through most of the twentieth century.30 While the rule 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1875(a) (2008) (providing that employers may not fire 
an employee for serving as a juror). 
24 See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 125 (1987) (expressing concern 
whether the jury system could, in fact, survive if the deliberation process were 
exposed to public scrutiny after the verdict was rendered).  
25 Jong Hi Bek v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96284 (N.D. IL 2008).   
26 See id.  
27 99 ENG. REP. 944 (K.B. 1785).  
28 Id. 
29 Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence: Is the Broad Exclusionary Principle of Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C. L. 
REV. 509, 513-22 (1988). 
30 See e.g. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915) (holding that jurors may 
not testify that they reached their decision by averaging the individual jurors’ 
opinions on damages).  
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remained the same, the modern justifications of jury secrecy moved 
from juror credibility to more pragmatic and policy based reasons 
which include: the finality of verdicts, protection of jurors, promotion 
of full and frank deliberations, and the maintenance of the 
community’s faith in juries and their verdicts.31 These policies 
supporting jury secrecy help justify Rule 606(b)’s prohibitions on 
post-verdict juror testimony.32 Therefore, a brief overview of the 
changes in common law policy provide a proper context for Rule 
606(b) analysis. 
Courts and scholars have recognized that verdict finality is 
important because, at some point, litigation has to end, and 
communities must be able to rely on court decisions as final.33 Thus, 
preserving verdict finality outweighs the importance of uncovering 
improper juror behavior in some instances, because destructive 
uncertainty may develop if courts were viewed as indecisive or if 
verdicts were impeached months or years after the litigation has 
ended.34 This is also consistent with the notion of a fair trial, because 
if a verdict is impeached and the judgment set aside, it may be year
before the case is retried, which may not produce a just verdict.
s 
 
h 
                                                
35 If 
the verdict is viewed as final, losing litigants will have little incentive
to threaten or harass jurors in order to elicit evidence that will impeac
the verdict.36  
 
31 See id. (noting that if “verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned” could 
be attacked and set aside on the testimony jurors, jurors would be harassed by the 
defeated party in an effort to set aside a verdict). 
32 See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 618 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The 
secrecy of deliberations is the cornerstone of the modern Anglo-American jury 
system.”)   
33 See Diehm, supra note 1, at 402.  
34 See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120(1987) (“Allegations of juror 
misconduct, incompetency, or inattentiveness, raised for the first time days, weeks, 
or months after the verdict, seriously disrupt the finality of the process.”).  
35 See Diehm, supra note 1, at 396. But see U.S. CONST. amend. V. (A jury 
verdict of “not guilty” is final and may not be impeached under the fifth amendment 
principles of double jeopardy).  
36 See James W. Diehm, supra note 1, at 403.   
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Impeachment based upon juror testimony would have a serious 
chilling affect upon jury deliberations if they were exposed to public 
scrutiny.37 By preventing litigants from using juror testimony to 
impeach a verdict, Rule 606(b) protects jurors from harassment by a 
defeated party “in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts 
which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.”38 
Without the restraints of Rule 606(b), members of the community may 
be reluctant to serve as jurors if there is a possibility that their 
comments will be made public, that they will be harassed after the 
verdict, or that they will be called to testify on matters pertaining to 
their jury service and deliberations.39   
Moreover, in order to achieve a just verdict, deliberations must 
allow the jurors to speak freely so that all of the members of the jury 
can be heard.40 Freedom to deliberate in secret is thought to promote 
good group dynamics within a jury, whereby jury members exchange 
ideas and concerns to reach a verdict that reflects community morals.41 
                                                 
37 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915) (holding that if evidence 
from juror testimony could be used, “the result would be to make what was intended 
to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation; to the 
destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.”); see also 
Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120-21 (explaining that post-verdict scrutiny undermines public 
trust in the judicial system).  
38 See McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267 (expressing concern that jurors might 
manufacture evidence to set aside the verdict).  
39 See Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of 
Postverdict Interviews, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 295, 314 (noting that if jury 
deliberations became public knowledge, “previously anonymous jurors, reaching a 
group decision based on ‘community values,’ and lay perspectives, will feel they 
must justify it in the court of public opinion.”); see also Diehm, supra note 1, at 
394–95.  
40 See Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987) (“fruitful 
exchange of ideas and impressions among jurors is thought to hinge heavily on some 
assurance that what is said in the jury room will not reach a larger audience.”); see 
also Diehm, supra note 1, at 400.  
41 See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933) (“[f]reedom of debate 
might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel 
that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the world.”); see also 
Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120-21 (1987) (noting that “full and frank 
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Jury privacy and secrecy may encourage more sensitive jurors to 
express their opinions freely by giving them the security that their 
views will remain private.42 Without secret deliberations, jurors will be 
less willing to express their views candidly and freely because they 
may be concerned that members of their community would learn of 
their individual position, which, in turn, could lead to the suppression 
of meritorious but unpopular views, or, worse yet, jurors may feel 
compelled to render a popular verdict rather than a just verdict.43 
Finally, the community’s trust in the jury system could be undermined 
because exposure of jury deliberations could potentially “unravel the 
distinctive [irrational] and intuitive ‘genius’ of this lay tribunal,” and 
undermine the jury’s role as a final decision maker. 44  
 
C. Early Common Law Exceptions to the Juror 
Impeachment Rule  
 
A brief overview of the common law and its underlying policies 
prior to the enactment of Rule 606(b) in 1975 will provide the context 
needed for this analysis. As previously mentioned, common law 
established a rigid rule that jurors, either through testimony or 
affidavit, were incompetent to impeach a verdict.45 This rule was 
designed to protect jurors in the hope that such protection would breed 
a truthful and just verdict.46 It follows that such a rigid rule may, in 
                                                                                                                   
discussion in the jury room” would be undermined if jurors’ views could be 
scrutinized after a trial).  
42 See id. 
43 See Diehm, supra note 1, at 396. 
44 See John H. Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial, 12 J. AM. JUD. 
SOC’Y 166, 170 (1929) (“The jury and the secrecy of the jury room, are the 
indispensable elements in popular justice.”); see also Goldstein, supra note 39, at 
314. 
45 See McDonald v. Pless 238 U.S. 264, 269 (U.S. 1915); Hyde & Schneider v. 
United States, 225 U.S. 347 (U.S. 1912).   
46 See id. (recognizing that if “verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned” 
could be attacked and set aside on the testimony jurors, jurors would be harassed by 
the defeated party in an effort to set aside a verdict). 
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fact, deny a fair trial as juror misconduct inevitably occurs because 
juries are comprised of imperfect human beings.47  
As the common law developed, it became clear that exceptions 
must be made to such a rigid rule. Early exceptions to the juror 
impeachment rule took two forms: (1) the Iowa Rule,48 which 
excluded juror testimony about matters that “essentially adhere in the 
verdict itself,” but admitted testimony relating to an “independent 
fact,” and (2) the Mattox Rule,49 which permitted jurors to testify to 
“external influences” that might have affected the jury’s decision but 
not to any “internal influences” relating to the jury’s deliberation 
process.50 A further evaluation of the common law cases reveals that 
the Supreme Court continued to apply the external influences of 
Mattox, but not the Iowa Rule.  
In McDonald v. Pless,51 the court made clear that, even if jurors 
awarded damages that are inconsistent with the jury instructions, the 
general rule is that losing litigant cannot use juror testimony to 
impeach a jury verdict. In Remmer v. United States,52 an unnamed 
person attempted to bribe a juror, and the juror reported the bribe to 
the trial judge before the verdict was returned.53 The judge informed 
                                                 
47 Dean Sanderford, The Sixth Amendment, Rule 606(b), and the Intrusion into 
Jury Deliberations of Religions Principles of Decision, 74 TENN. L. REV. 167, 173 
(2007) (“A juror’s reliance on personal beliefs and experiences, while recognized as 
one of the great strengths of the jury system, also enhances the risk that the ultimate 
decision will be unfaithful to the law and facts of the case.”).  
48 Wright v. Ill. & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210-11 (1866) (permitting 
testimony that a jury had reached a quotient verdict because this testimony was 
objectively verifiable and not based on the jury’s thought processes during the 
deliberations.). 
49  Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150-51 (1892) (classifying both 
outside information provided by a bailiff and newspapers brought into the jury room 
as “external influences.”). 
50 See id.  
51 238 U.S. 264, 269 (U.S. 1915) (Jurors had assessed damages based on the 
average of the individual juror’s opinions.); see also Hyde & Schneider v. United 
States, 225 U.S. 347 (U.S. 1912) 
52 347 U.S. 227 (1954) 
53 Id. at 228. 
 437
10
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 7
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss2/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 4, Issue 2                         Spring 2009 
the prosecutor and called the FBI to investigate, but the defendant was 
not informed of the incident until after the trial.54 In reversing the trial 
court’s decision, the Court concluded that a hearing was required to 
determine whether the bribe involved private communication, contact, 
or tampering with a juror.55  
The Court also allowed testimony about the influence of third 
parties in both Turner v. Louisiana56 and Parker v. Gladden.57 In 
Turner, the Court held that the defendant had been denied the right to 
an impartial jury trial when two deputy sheriffs, who presented key 
testimony for the State during the trial, supervised and socialized with 
jurors outside of the courtroom.58 In Parker, the bailiff responsible for 
overseeing the sequestered jurors, told jurors that the “wicked fellow” 
was guilty and that if the jury made a mistake, the Supreme Court 
would correct it.59 In both cases, the Court focused on the Sixth 
Amendment’s promise of an impartial jury trial and the related 
requirement that all evidence considered by the jury be presented 
during the trial.60 The Court underscored the importance of the Sixth 
Amendment's right to a jury trial, stating that "at the very least…the 
evidence developed against a defendant shall come from the witness 
                                                 
54 Id. (The trial judge did not inform the defendant because the investigation 
revealed that the bribe was not credible.)  
55 Id. at 229-230 (holding that “any private communication, contact, or 
tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending 
before the jury . . . presumptively prejudicial.”). The Court was also troubled by ex 
parte actions of trial judge and prosecutor. Id. 
56 379 U.S. 466 (1965). 
57 385 U.S. 363 (1966). 
58 Turner, 379 U.S. at 473 (The jurors’ interaction with the sheriffs potentially 
prejudiced the jurors by bolstering the credibility of the sheriffs’ testimony, thus 
subverting the defendant’s right to challenge the sheriffs’ credibility meaningfully 
through cross-examination during the trial.).  
59 Parker, 385 U.S. at 364. 
60 See id. at 364-65  ("We have followed the undeviating rule that the rights of 
confrontation and cross-examination are among the fundamental requirements of a 
constitutionally fair trial.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also 
Turner, 379 U.S. at 472.  
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stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of 
the defendant's rights."61  
These common law cases, as reflected by the subsequent 
legislative history, provided foreshadowing for what became the 
exceptions in Rule 606(b). Accordingly, an outside influence is when 
someone or something attempts to sway the jury (such as a bribe or a 
threat), thus depriving a defendant of an impartial jury.62 Whereas 
extraneous prejudicial information is akin to “testimonial”63 
information introduced without an opportunity for cross-
examination.64 It is also possible that an event could be both an 
outside influence and extraneous prejudicial informa 65tion.   
                                                
 
D. The Legislative History of Rule 606(b) and the 
Subsequent Applications 
 
Adopted in 1975, Rule 606(b) codified both the common law 
juror impeachment rule and the exceptions carved out by subsequent 
decisions.66 Its legislative history shows a debate over whether to 
adopt the more expansive policy of the Iowa Rule or to adopt the 
narrower “external influences” approach.67 In the preliminary draft of 
Rule 606(b), the Supreme Court Advisory Committee allowed juror 
 
61 Turner, 379 U.S. at 472-73 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. ("[I]t 
would be blinking reality not to recognize the extreme prejudice inherent in this 
continual association throughout the trial between the jurors and these two key 
witnesses for the prosecution.").  
62 See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-230 (U.S. 1954). 
63 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004) (holding that the 
Confrontation Clause is a procedural guarantee that the reliability of testimonial 
evidence will be tested through the “crucible of cross-examination”). 
64 See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) (jury learn information 
about the case from the newspaper). 
65 See Parker, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (information about the defendant’s guilt 
came from the bailiff outside of the courtroom).   
66 See Diehm, supra note 1, at 413.  
67 See id. at 413-14 (providing a detailed explanation of the legislative history); 
Tanner, 483 U.S. at 122-25 (same); see also supra Part II. C. (discussing the Iowa 
Rule and the Mattox Rule). 
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testimony as to statements or acts occurring during deliberations and 
precluded only testimony concerning the effect that such statements or 
acts had on the juror's mind or the decision, but its final draft only 
permitted juror testimony on external influences that were brought to 
bear upon any juror.68 Congress was initially split on the different 
versions but ultimately enacted the committee’s final draft which 
reflects the more restrictive approach to Rule 606(b).69 The core 
pronouncement of the rule closely resembles the early American 
common law rule that the losing party cannot, in order to secure a new 
trial, use the testimony of jurors to impeach their verdict.70 The 
exceptions, “extraneous prejudicial information”71 and “outside 
influence,”72 generally track the common law exceptions provided in 
Mattox, Remmer, Turner, and Parker.73 
The Court first addressed the application of Rule 606(b) in Tanner 
v. United States,74 where the defendant sought an evidentiary hearing, 
claiming that the jury’s alleged drug and alcohol use during the trial 
was an outside influence and a violation of the Impartial Jury 
Clause.75 The Court denied relief because the alleged drug and alcohol
use was “internal” to the deliberation process and an evidentiary 
hearing would allow inquiry "into the internal processes of the jury."76 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court appeared to adopt the 
“external/internal influence test” used by the lower courts that had 
77 78
 
applied Rule 606(b).  Under this test, an “outside influence”  is not 
                                                 
.S. 264, 269 (U.S. 1915); Hyde & Schneider v. 
Unit 2).   
(b)(2). 
rd,  note 47, at 181.  
87). 
 report 
68 Id. 
69 Id.    
70 See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U
ed States, 225 U.S. 347 (U.S. 191
71 FED. RULE. EVID. 606(b)(1). 
72 FED. RULE. EVID. 606
supra73 See Sanderfo
74 483 U.S. 107 (19
75 Id. at 117.   
76 Id. at 117, 120.  
77 Id. at 127 (recognizing other aspects of the trial process that protect the 
defendant's right to an impartial jury, such as voir dire, the ability of jurors to
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on based on whether the influence literally occurred inside or outside 
the jury room; rather courts must assess “the nature of the 
influence."79 In other words, courts must evaluate each allegation o
case-by-case basis to determine whether they should admit juror
testimony. This test recognizes that Rule 606(b) prohibits jurors
testifying about “internal” influences, but it also recognizes that jur
may testify about “external” influences.
n a 
 
 from 
ors 
 
80 While the Court mainly 
addressed outside influences, it did discuss extraneous prejudicial
information.     
 
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN ARREOLA V. CHOUDRY 
 
A. Northern District of Illinois - Judge Kennelly Presiding  
 
In 2003, Gilbert R. Arreola, a prisoner at Hill Correctional Center, 
injured his ankle and was taken to the prison infirmary for treatment 
where Doctor Mohammed Choudry examined him, diagnosed him 
with a sprained ankle, ordered him back to his cell, and scheduled a 
follow-up visit in seven to ten days.81 A few days later, Arreola was 
transferred to Cook County Jail, had an x-ray of his ankle taken, 
learned that it was broken, and sued Dr. Choudry.82  
During voir dire, potential jurors were asked, "Have you or any 
family member ever had a broken or severely sprained ankle, foot, or 
                                                                                                                   
any m nduct before the conclusion of the trial, jurors are under oath to uphold the 
law, urt, by counsel, and by other jurors).   
).  
uence” 
unde
533 F.3d 601, 603 (7th Cir. 2008) cert. denied, 2008 
U.S.
. 
cal need in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United 
State titution. 
isco
and they are observable by the co
78 See FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2
79 Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117.  
80 See id. (explaining that the proper test for allegations of “outside infl
r Rule 606(b) is for courts to determine the “nature of the influence”).  
81 Arreola v. Choudry, 
 LEXIS 8576 (2008). 
82 Id. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983; Arreola claimed that Dr
Choudry's, the prison doctor, treatment of his injured ankle was a deliberate 
indifference to a medi
s Cons
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leg?" Juror Laterza, later elected foreperson, answered "no."83 
Fourteen prospective jurors, six of whom sat as jurors during tria
answered this question affirmatively.
l, 
s 
suff
d 
 
al 
e 
ola alleged that Laterza “had no 
prob
 
 
f that she lied during voir dire and her previous injury was 
not extraneous prejudicial information; thus, no further inquiry was 
required.91  
                                                
84 Arreola challenged two juror
for cause based on their personal experiences with ankle sprains 
ered by family members but later withdrew his challenge when 
they said that they would be able to put aside those experiences.85  
Following a two day trial, the jury found Dr. Choudry not guilty 
and, after the verdict was returned, the parties were permitted to speak 
to the jurors.86 Following conversations between Arreola’s lawyer an
members of the jury, Arreola motioned for a new trial supported by an
affidavit stating that Juror Laterza based the verdict on her person
experience with an ankle injury and used her experience to influenc
other jurors.87 In particular, Arre
lem believing that Dr. Choudry could press on Arreola's ankle 
without finding tenderness.”88  
Based upon this motion, Judge Kennelly investigated further and 
coordinated a telephone conversation with Laterza.89 Prior to this
telephone conversation, he permitted both lawyers to submit questions 
for him to ask Laterza, but he rejected questions involving juror 
deliberations.90 Following his telephone interview with Laterza, Judge 
Kennelly concluded that a new trial was not warranted because there
was no proo
 
83 Id. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. Judge Kennelly asked follow up questions pertaining to ankle injuries to 
all that answered affirmatively, each juror that answered affirmatively assured the 
judge that they would be impartial if selected to serve. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 603-04 
88 Id. 
89 Id.  
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 605.  
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B. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
Arreola appealed the district court’s refusal to grant a new trial, 
arguing that his due process rights were violated and that the court 
misapplied the standard for evaluating juror bias.92 In particular, he 
claimed that Laterza was not truthful during voir dire when she did not 
reveal her previous ankle injury.93 In affirming the decision of the 
district court, the Seventh Circuit showed significant deference to 
Judge Kennelly’s findings of fact.94  
The first issue addressed on appeal was Areola’s due process 
claim.95 Due process requires a jury capable and willing to decide the 
case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge to watch for 
prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences 
when they happen.96 Contrary to Arreola’s demand, due process does 
not require a new trial every time jurors have been placed in a 
potentially compromising situation.97 The court conceded that while 
due process may require a hearing to determine if extraneous contacts 
had affected the jury’s ability to be fair, a hearing is not required for 
pre-existing bias, because pre-existing bias should be discovered 
during voir dire.98 If a hearing was needed, the nature of the hearing 
should allow all interested parties to participate and, to some extent, 
should include a determination by the trial judge of the circumstances, 
                                                 
92 Id. at 604-05. 
93 Id. at 604. 
94 Id. (citing United States v. Medina, 430 F.3d 869, 875 (7th Cir. 2005) 
("[T]here are compelling institutional considerations…in favor of appellate 
deference to the trial judge's evaluation of … juror bias.") (citing United States v. 
McClinton, 135 F.3d 1178, 1186 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Trial courts have wide discretion 
in deciding a motion for a new trial.”)).  
95 Id. at 604-06. 
96 Id. at 605 (citing Oswald v. Bertrand, 374 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
97 Id. (citing Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118, 104 S. Ct. 453 (1983)). 
98 Id. at 606 (citing United States v. Connolly,  341 F.3d 16, 34-35 (1st Cir. 
2003) (holding that a juror's notes are an intrinsic influence on a jury's verdict, thus 
an evidentiary hearing is not required).  
 443
16
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 7
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss2/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 4, Issue 2                         Spring 2009 
the impact of those circumstances on the jury, and whether or not the 
result of those circumstances prejudiced the verdict.99 
Deferring to the district court’s findings, the court held that 
Laterza's prior experience with an ankle injury was an “intrinsic 
influence” and that Rule 606(b) prohibits using the jurors to impeach 
the verdict.100 The court further acknowledged that jurors are expected 
to evaluate the evidence presented at trial in light of their own 
experiences and common sense when deliberating; however, jurors 
may not go beyond the record to develop their own evidence.101 The 
Seventh Circuit held that the trial judge’s post-verdict voir dire 
satisfied due process because he investigated “the allegation of bias in 
a direct and conscientious manner, keeping in mind that the integrity 
of jury proceedings must not be jeopardized by unauthorized 
invasions.”102 Any further inquiry into the jury’s thought processes 
concerning deliberations would have violated Rule 606(b); thus, Judge 
Kennelly correctly treated the allegation as an "internal matter."103  
 
IV. QUESTIONS REMAINING AFTER ARREOLA 
 
While the Seventh Circuit correctly held that Laterza’s knowledge 
of ankle injuries was not extraneous prejudicial information, it 
declined to explain what would qualify as extraneous prejudicial 
                                                 
99 Id. at 604 (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982)).  
100 Id. at 606 (citing Marquez v. City of Albuquerque, 399 F.3d 1216, 1223 
(10th Cir. 2005) ("[A] juror's personal experience does not constitute extraneous 
prejudicial information."); Peterson v. Wilson, 141 F.3d 573, 577-78 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that juror discussion of personal past experience is not "extrinsic" evidence 
that requires a new trial)).  
101 Arreola, 533 F.3d at 606 (citing Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 
(7th Cir. 1987) ("We cannot expunge from jury deliberations the subjective opinions 
of jurors, their attitudinal expositions, or their philosophies. These involve the very 
human elements that constitute one of the strengths of our jury system.")). 
102 Id. at 607. 
103 Id. citing United States v. Briggs, 291 F.3d 958, 963-64 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that post-verdict allegations of juror intimidation during the deliberative 
process were not extraneous prejudicial information or an outside influence, thus 
under Rule 606(b) neither a hearing nor a new trial was warranted).  
 444
17
Reidy: No Jury Rigging in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit:
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 4, Issue 2                         Spring 2009 
information. Additionally, the court declined Arreola’s request for 
cross-examination and the ability to call witnesses, but in declining his 
request the court cited a Supreme Court case in which an evidentiary 
hearing was held.104 Finally, the court did not set forth a procedural 
standard for the district courts to follow when applying Rule 606(b). 
This section will attempt to address these issues. Under this proposed 
solution, courts must first determine whether information presented is 
extraneous prejudicial information under Rule 606(b) by applying a 
totality of circumstances test. If it is, this section will then attempt to 
provide procedural guidance to determine whether a hearing is 
required.    
 
A. Extraneous Prejudicial Information 
 
The exceptions under Rule 606(b) do not apply to every instance 
in which a juror considers facts or data outside the record, yet what 
qualifies as extraneous prejudicial information is far from clear. While 
the language of Rule 606(b) is vague in some contexts, it is fairly clear 
that general influences on a verdict, such as values or biases applied 
by the individual jurors, are not within the scope of this language 
because this is expected of jurors.105 However, a line is crossed when 
they become investigators of the case.106 In general, courts have 
interpreted “extraneous prejudicial information” as evidence that was 
not presented at trial and, therefore, not subject to challenge in open 
                                                 
104 Id. at 605 (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)). 
105 See e.g. United States v. O'Brien, 14 F.3d 703, 708 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[I]n 
gauging witness credibility and choosing from among competing inferences, jurors 
are entitled to take full advantage of their collective experience and common 
sense."); Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that the 
subjective opinions of jurors, their attitudinal expositions, or their philosophies, 
including racial biases are not extraneous prejudicial information).  
106 See People v. Wadle, 97 P.3d 932 (Colo. 2004) (finding “extraneous 
prejudicial information” when a juror conducted an internet search regarding the 
drug allegedly taken by the defendant). 
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court.107 Accordingly, these courts have permitted juror testimony as 
to the jury's consideration of extra-record information derived from
books, newspapers and other public media, court documents, other 
objects not in evidence, experiments or investigations, or views of the 
relevant scene or premises.
 
                                                
108 Courts have not allowed, on the other 
hand, juror testimony as to the effect of security measures taken at 
trial, events that took place in open court, intra-jury influences such as 
intimidation or harassment, the use by a juror of notes, and other 
matters not classifiable as either information or evidence.109 
While the text of Rule 606(b) states that information must be 
prejudicial to allow juror testimony, the determination of prejudicial 
information is far from clear.110 In attempting to define “extraneous 
prejudicial information,” some courts have distinguished between 
“general information,” which is not covered by the exception, and 
“specific facts,” which are covered.111 Some courts conflate the two 
exceptions of Rule 606(b) and form a hybrid test, referring to both 
 
107 See Sanderford, supra note 47, at 182; Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 
140 (1892) (newspaper article about the case considered by the jury). 
108 See 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
6075 (2nd ed. 2009) (synthesizing factors used in lower court decisions).  
109 See id. 
110 See, e.g., In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207, 215 (6th Cir. 
1982) (allowing juror's letter stating that he considered extraneous information about 
the case and it effected his decision); United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (jurors read a file with highly prejudicial information about the 
defendant). But see, e.g., United States v. Paneras, 222 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(cartoon depicting events at trial drawn by juror was not an extraneous influence); 
United States v. Calbas, 821 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the jury’s 
consultation telephone directory was not prejudicial information). 
111 See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 151 (3rd 
1975) (holding that a verdict is not invalid merely because the jurors' generalized 
knowledge about the parties, or some other aspect of the case); Morgan v. Woessner, 
997 F.2d 1244, 1261 (9th 1993) (“The type of after-acquired information that 
potentially taints a jury verdict should be carefully distinguished from the general 
knowledge, opinions, feelings and bias that every juror carries into the jury room.”). 
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exceptions under the umbrella of “external influences.”112 One circuit 
court has taken the position that extraneous information under Rule 
606(b) only applies to matters that could not have been discovered 
during voir dire, either because the juror's exposure to extra-record 
evidence occurred after voir dire or the juror lied during that 
process.113 Another circuit has made clear that the information must 
bear on a fact at issue in the case and anything else is extraneous 
prejudicial information.114 
The general knowledge/fact specific test begs the question of what 
is “general knowledge”115 and it has been criticized as vague and 
unworkable.116 The hybrid test fails to recognize that Congress created 
two distinct exceptions and while some instances may be both an 
outside influence and extraneous prejudicial information, nonetheless, 
courts must recognize that there are two different exceptions and two 
different analytical frameworks. Finally, the rigid requirement that the 
information bear on a fact at issue in the case does not recognize that 
jurors may be influenced by other information. 
                                                 
112 See Robinson v. Polk, 438 F.3d 350, 363 (4th Cir. 2006) (“We use the term 
"external influence"…to refer to both extraneous prejudicial information and outside 
influences.); see also United States v. Logan, 250 F.3d 350, 380 (6th Cir. 2001). 
113 See United States v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 73, 75 (8th Cir.1991) (holding that 
the trial court did not err in finding that the comments of a juror that she had talked 
with an attorney was not extraneous information sufficient to invalidate the verdicts 
against the defendant because the juror “did not have any contact with any attorney 
during the progress of the case or deliberations, and did not speak with anyone in a 
manner inappropriate or inconsistent with proper jury service.”).  
114 Robinson, 438 F.3d at 363 n.15 (Under Rule 606(b) “prejudicial” means  
that the information bears on a fact at issue in the case otherwise the list of 
ingredients on the packs of coffee provided for jurors would be extraneous 
prejudicial information because it is ‘extraneous’ to the evidence presented in the 
case and because it is ‘information.).  
115 Compare Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 780 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
Bible passages used by the jury were “notions of general currency that inform the 
moral judgment [of jurors]…”), with Oliver v. Quarterman, 541 F.3d 329, 339 (5th 
Cir. 2008) (“when a juror brings a Bible into the deliberations and points out to her 
fellow jurors specific passages that describe the very facts at issue in the case, the 
juror has crossed an important line.”).   
116 See Crump, supra note 29, at 540. 
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Because these tests do not appear to be workable for all future 
cases, the Seventh Circuit should adopt a “totality of circumstances” 
test117 in determining whether information is extraneous and 
prejudicial. The factors the court should consider include: (1) the 
importance of the issue to which the information related, (2) the nature 
of the information, (3) the strength of the admitted evidence 
supporting the verdict, (4) the number of jurors exposed to the 
information, (5) when the jury was exposed to the information, (6) 
how long the jury discussed these matters during deliberations, (7) the 
manner in which the court dealt with the information at trial, (8) and 
any other matters which might have a bearing on the effect of the 
information or influence on the jury.118   
Application of the totality of circumstances allows courts more 
flexibility than any of the aforementioned tests, especially when the 
alleged information is a close call. For instance, courts appear split 
whether Rule 606(b) authorizes the receipt of testimony that jurors 
consulted a Bible during deliberations.119 The application of these 
factors could change the outcome depending upon the unique 
circumstances of the case.120 For example, how the information 
reached the jury is critical because a juror’s internal knowledge of the 
Bible is less likely to be extraneous.121 However, just because the 
information is “internal” to the juror does not make the information 
per se internal to the deliberation process. For example, in Oliver v. 
                                                 
117 Cf. Rogers v. McDorman, 521 F.3d 381, 396 (5th Cir. 2008) (examining the 
"totality of circumstances" in determining whether a jury reached a compromise 
verdict). 
118 See 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
6075 (2nd ed. 2009) (providing a synthesis of factors used in lower court decisions).  
119 See Oliver, 541 F.3d at 339 n. 11 (“The Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, 
Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have not spoken on this issue.”). 
120 See United States v. Lara-Ramirez, 519 F.3d 76, 89 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting 
that there exists no per se rule of the Bible’s effect in the jury room). 
121 See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) (holding that information 
was prejudicial when bailiff provided it to the jury); cf. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 
127, 149 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing that it is expected of jurors to 
uses their past knowledge when deliberating). 
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Quarterman the jury consulted a Bible passage with parallel facts to 
the underlying case and rendered a death sentence, just as the Bible 
proscribed.122 The Fifth Circuit recognized that the Fourth Circuit’s123 
rigid rule that the information must be about the case could deny a fair 
trial if jurors use a jury instruction from Jesus as opposed to the court’s 
instruction.124 While certain passages from the Bible may be 
considered common knowledge, others might not.125 Because these 
questions cannot be answered in the abstract, courts must allow for 
juror questioning when information, such as the Bible, is used during 
deliberations. Thus, a hearing of some type is required. 
The totality of circumstance test recognizes that mere allegations 
should not be sufficient to ignore the extensive history of juror 
incompetency, but it recognizes that the other protections, both before 
and during trial, may not be sufficient to assure a fair trial.126 
Therefore, juror testimony should be held incompetent unless it relates 
to overt matters that authoritatively inject facts not contained in the 
                                                 
122 541 F.3d at 340 (evaluating the nature of this passage, the court correctly 
held that this was extraneous prejudicial information).   
123 See Robinson v. Polk, 438 F.3d 350, 363 n.15 (4th Cir. 2006). 
124 See Oliver, 541 F.3d at 332 n. 3 (Defendant was on capital trial for murder, 
alleging beating the victim to death with end of a gun, and the jurors read and used a 
Bible passage from the Book of Number; “And if he smite him with an instrument of 
iron, so that he die, he is a murderer: the murderer shall surely be put to death.”). 
 125 Compare Burch v. Corcoran, 273 F.3d 577, 591 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting 
that the certain passages such as “an eye for an eye” are “statements of folk wisdom 
or of cultural precepts"), with Oliver, 541 F.3d at 340 (holding that passage used by 
jurors paralleled the facts of the case and was not general knowledge because it 
taught that capital punishment is appropriate for a person who strikes another over 
the head with an object and causes the person's death). 
126 See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (U.S. 1987) (discussing 
other protections available before and during the trial to ensure a fair trial). 
 449
22
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 7
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss2/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 4, Issue 2                         Spring 2009 
evidence127 or principles of decision not within the applicable law,128 
into the jury's deliberation.129 
 
B. Procedural Issues with Rule 606(b)  
 
Rule 606(b) is silent as to how courts should proceed once a trial 
has been completed and juror misconduct is alleged.130 Prior to the 
enactment of Rule 606(b), if a criminal defendant demonstrated that 
extraneous information was present during deliberations it was 
deemed presumptively prejudicial and the burden shifted to the 
government to prove that the information was harmless.131 Subsequent 
to the enactment of Rule 606(b) and the Supreme Court’s 
interpretations thereof, trial courts appear split as to whether the 
presumption of prejudice still applies. Some courts have held that Rule 
606(b) codified the entire common law, including the presumption of 
prejudice. Other courts have held that Rule 606(b) created a procedural 
change that places an initial burden on the moving party.132  
The presumption of prejudice approach is flawed because it would 
create a blueprint for criminal defendants to impeach guilty verdicts if 
a mere showing of extraneous prejudicial information shifted the 
burden to the government to rebut. Hypothetically, a defendant 
accused of a felony could hire someone to “influence” a juror, 
                                                 
127 See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) (holding that information 
was prejudicial when bailiff provided it to the jury). 
128 See Oliver, 541 F.3d 329 (Bible passage commanded death for an act 
similar to the facts presented at trial).  
129 See Crump, supra note 29, at 540.   
130 See FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
131 See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) ("any private 
communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during trial 
about the matter pending before the jury" is presumptively prejudicial. 
132 Compare United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 551 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(examining the jury’s use of a dictionary during deliberations under Remmer’s 
presumption of prejudice), with United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F. 3d 490, 503 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that a juror’s use of a dictionary did not raise a 
presumption of prejudice).  
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introduce the external influence after the verdict, and the government 
would have to rebut the presumption. The government would struggle 
to overcome this burden because the text of Rule 606(b) prohibits the 
questioning of jurors as to the affect of any such influence.133 This 
defies the notion of a fair and just verdict. 
Based on the policies of Rule 606(b)134 and its subsequent case 
law, it appears that the proper procedure is to place an initial burden on 
the moving party to show (1) that information was presented to the 
jury outside of the courtroom and (2) that a reasonable probability 
exists that the information influenced the jury’s verdict.135 If the 
responding party can prove that the information was harmless, then the 
court should dismiss the motion and deny any further inquiry.136 While 
this may sound simplistic in the abstract, the cases have proven that 
this can be a difficult task because there is a fine line between juror 
knowledge and extraneous prejudicial information.137 There can be no 
bright line procedure in every case. However, where the court 
conducts an inquiry broad enough to lead it to a reasonable judgment 
that there has been no prejudice, it has fulfilled its procedural as well 
                                                 
133 See United States v. Maree, 934 F.2d 196, 201 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(distinguishing between testimony concerning a statement and its impact). 
134 See supra Part II. B.  
135 See United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing 
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-16 (1982) for the proposition that Rule 606(b) 
created a substantive change in the law, eliminating any presumption of prejudice 
and placed a burden on the moving party); Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 
127 (U.S. 1987) (“even if Rule 606(b) is interpreted to retain the common-law 
exception allowing post-verdict inquiry of juror incompetence…the showing made 
by petitioners falls far short of this standard.”(emphasis added)). 
136 See United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 818 (2nd Cir. 
1970) (“The touchstone of decision…is thus not the mere fact of infiltration of some 
molecules of extra-record matter…but the nature of what has been infiltrated and the 
probability of prejudice.”).  
137  See Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 321, 327 (7th Cir.2005) (deeming a juror's 
knowledge from outside sources that the defendant had taken a polygraph test during 
the trial to be an external influence). 
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as its substantive duty.138 Ultimately, trial courts must use prudent 
discretion in assessing whether further inquiry is required, 139 but they 
should proceed cautiously.140 
Even if the jury has been exposed to extraneous prejudicial 
information, some courts141 have held that Rule 606(b) prohibits jurors 
from testifying as to the effects on the jury's decision, while other 
courts permit such testimony.142 Some courts are concerned that the 
very holding of a hearing will give rise to the risks and problems that 
Rule 606(b) contemplates, especially if jurors are called to testify.143 
The only actual prohibition in the rule is the use of a juror’s testimony 
as evidence to overturn a verdict or indictment, but after a trial is over, 
jurors are free to discuss their deliberations with litigants or the media 
without running afoul of Rule 606(b).144 Moreover, Rule 606(b) does 
                                                 
138 See Smith, 455 U.S. at 215-16; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 561 
(2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing evidentiary hearing for habeas corpus).   
139 See United States v. Sanders, 962 F.2d 660, 673 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The trial 
judge will always be in a better position…to assess the probable reactions of jurors 
in a case over which he has presided.").  
140 See United States v. Vitale, 459 F.3d 190, 197 (2d Cir. 2006) (instructing 
that district courts should be reluctant "to haul jurors  in after they have reached a 
verdict in order to probe for potential instances of bias, misconduct or extraneous 
influences."). 
141 See, e.g., McElroy v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 894 F.2d 1504, 1511 
(11th Cir. 1990) (Rule 606(b) precluded considering the emotional state of mind of 
the distraught juror and the possible effect of her state of mind on that of the other 
jurors); Brofford v. Marshall, 751 F.2d 845, 853 (6th Cir. 1985) (juror may be 
permitted to give statement that she had preconceptions concerning defendant's guilt, 
but she could not be asked the effect those preconceptions had on her verdict).  
142 See, e.g., In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207, 215 (6th Cir. 
1982)(admitting juror's letter stating that he not only considered extraneous 
prejudicial information but that it was a factor in his decision making); Krause v. 
Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563, 571 (6th Cir. 1977) (Rule 606(b) does not rule out permitting 
jurors to testify as to the effect on their decision of matters properly classifiable as 
outside influences).  
143See United States v. Calbas, 821 F.2d 887, 896 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that 
the trial court "wisely refrained from allowing the inquiry to become an adversarial 
evidentiary hearing, so as to minimize intrusion on the jury's deliberations."). 
144 FED. R. EVID. 606(b).  
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not impose any sanctions on parties who harass jurors, nor does it 
prohibit jurors from divulging details about their deliberations. Thus, 
according to these courts, Rule 606(b) can uphold its policies only if 
information gained from post-verdict contact with jurors is not used 
for any purpose, including the procurement of a hearing.145 While a 
full hearing may be the best way to determine the impact of the 
alleged information, it is quite possible that a juror who has been 
compromised by threats or coercion will persist in the position 
induced, thus concealing the fact that he has been threatened or 
pressured, and even after a hearing, the court will remain unaware of 
the impropriety.146 
C. Hearings under Rule 606(b)   
 
Perhaps the most important issue to be decided in a case where a 
party is seeking to impeach a jury verdict is whether a court should 
hold a hearing.147 Litigants can protect their constitutional rights only 
if they are permitted to take steps to determine whether any basis for 
jury impeachment exists; however, courts have consistently upheld 
rules and orders restricting communication between parties and 
jurors.148 Even if the courts were to determine that a “hearing” is 
appropriate, the type of hearing is not found within the text of Rule 
606(b).149 The Supreme Court150 stated that an evidentiary hearing or 
a Remmer151 type of hearing is appropriate once the procedural 
                                                 
145 See Diehm, supra note 1, at 401.  
146 Id. 
147 See id. (explaining that the party seeking to impeach the verdict often will 
request that the court hold a hearing to determine whether the allegations are well-
founded, but such requests are usually denied). 
148 See id. at 405.  
149 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-71 (1970) (discussing the 
applicability of hearings to various situations and the general requirements of 
different hearings); see also Arreola v. Choudry, 533 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2008) 
cert. denied, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 8576 (2008) (asking for a “meaningful hearing”).  
150  Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 210 (1982) (hearing was required by a 
New York State law).  
151 Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-230 (1954). 
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thresholds have been satisfied.152 The benefits153 of a hearing are 
obvious because it may be the best method of determining the merits 
of the alleged influence on the verdict.154 
In Arreola, Arreola argued that due process required a meaningful 
hearing; specifically, he wanted an opportunity for cross-examination, 
an opportunity to call witnesses, and he felt that the juror should have 
been sworn in before questioning.155 Contrary to this request, the 
Seventh Circuit correctly handled this situation and satisfied all 
constitutional challenges while following the text of Rule 606(b) 
because the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is the opportunity 
to prove actual bias.156 Both parties were given the opportunity to 
participate by asking questions through the filter of the trial judge.157 
Although the trial judge did not ask all the questions presented by 
Arreola, due process does not require courts to ask every question to 
jurors.158 Consistent with the demands of the Constitution and the 
precedent of the Supreme Court, Rule 606(b) does not demand a 
“meaningful hearing”159 any time juror impartiality is alleged. 
Therefore, a hearing is not required per se; rather, trial courts must 
determine the circumstances on an ad hoc basis and then determine 
whether further inquiry is required.160 
                                                 
152 Smith, 455 U.S. at 217 (“holding that “determinations [of jury verdict 
prejudice] may properly be made at a hearing like that ordered in Remmer” or if 
state law requires as in this case).  
153 See supra Part II. (discussing policy reasons for not allowing juror 
testimony).  
154 See Diehm, supra note 1, at 401-402. 
155 Arreola v. Choudry, 533 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2008) cert. denied, 2008 
U.S. LEXIS 8576 (2008).   
156 See Smith, 455 U.S. at 215-16.  
157 Arreola, 533 F.3d at 606. 
158 United States v. Meader, 118 F. 3d 876, 876, 878-81 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(holding that trial courts have no obligation to ask counsel’s specific questions while 
conducting a post-verdict voir dire of a juror for potential bias).   
159 See Arreloa, 533 F.3d at 605.  
160 See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-230 (1954) (court must 
“determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not 
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V. CONCLUSION  
 
While the Seventh Circuit correctly denied Arreola further relief, 
Rule 606(b) has yet to be fully defined by the Seventh Circuit. 
Consistent with the authority set forth in this article, the Seventh 
Circuit should formally adopt a totality of the circumstances test for 
“extraneous prejudicial information.” Since Rule 606(b) is silent on 
procedure, the Seventh Circuit should place the initial burden upon the 
moving party to show that the extraneous information was prejudicial 
to the verdict; the burden would then shift to the responding party to 
prove that the information was harmless. Trial courts must allow the 
litigants an opportunity to prove juror bias but must exercise discretion 
so as not to disturb to underlying policies of Rule 606(b). While there 
may be some circumstances where Rule 606(b) must yield to 
Constitutional demands, courts should be reluctant to disturb jury 
verdicts based on the extensive history behind the rule of juror 
impeachment. 
                                                                                                                   
[the external influence] was prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties 
permitted to participate.”).  
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